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the bosniaks, the croats and the 
serbs in bosnia-herzegovina: their 
experiences of yugoslavia
in permanent 
gap
HUSNIJA KAMBEROVIĆ
Now that integration into Europe is on the public agenda, the 
discourse in Bosnia-Herzegovina is tending to build up a narra-
tive about Bosnia-Herzegovina that is not actually integrating but 
returning to Europe from which it was “torn away” when it joined 
the Yugoslav state in 1918. Similar narratives, characteristic of Cro-
atia and Slovenia, may have found their way into Bosnia-Herze-
govina too. Indeed, what happened to Bosnia-Herzegovina from 
1918 up to 1992, and was it really “abducted” from Europe where, 
as part of the Habsburg Monarchy, it had spent the last decades of 
the 19th and first decades of the 20th century? Has Bosnia-Herze-
govina returned to the Balkans since 1918, where it had been up to 
1878 and wherefrom, now in the early 21st century, it is trying to 
join Europe or – in line with this new narrative – is it once again 
“making a break” for it? What, in this sense, are Bosniak, Croat 
and Serb experiences of Yugoslavia and what memories of Yugo-
slavia are they building in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
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BETWEEN THE STATE OF SLOVENS, 
CROATS AND SERBS AND THE KINGDOM 
OF SLOVENS, CROATS AND SERBS
They experienced Yugoslavia differently. The Bosniaks and the 
Croats joined Yugoslavia in 1918 after centuries of life in multi-eth-
nic empires. The Bosniaks experienced the Ottoman Empire as 
their own, while the Croats mostly saw the Habsburg Monarchy 
as best suited to their national interests as a whole. Bosnian Serbs 
mostly nourished bad memories of these two empires. Hence, 
Yugoslavia was for them a state best suited to their national inter-
ests in toto. These all seem to be the starting points for Bosniak, 
Serbian and Croatian understanding of the very act of establish-
ment of the Yugoslav state in 1918. “A Bosniak is never satisfied with 
anything. He is a threesome. What suits a Croat is unacceptable to 
a Muslim or a Serb, and the other way round. The Muslims aim for 
some kind of autonomy and integration into Hungary, at least most 
of them do, the Serbs yearn for some kind of Serbian state, while the 
Croats want to be incorporated into Croatia,” said General Stjepan 
Sarkotić, head of the administration for Bosnia-Herzegovina, at an 
audience with Emperor Karl in the spring of 1918.
And yet, though the true will of the people in Bosnia at the 
time regarding the establishment of the state of Yugoslavia is hard 
to determine, the standpoints of the political elites (or whoever 
today believes that they belong to this group) about the issue can 
at least be outlined.
The end of World War I left the Muslim political elite total-
ly disoriented. Although historical processes clearly indicate that 
great monarchies – and thus the Habsburg Empire – were near-
ing their end, in 1917 Muslim politicians submitted to Austrian 
Emperor Karl a memorandum in which they dreamed of Bosnia-
Herzegovina with a special autonomous status within the monar-
chy! At the time everyone was involved in the creation of a new 
state, including a section of the Muslim youth that, under the 
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influence of various structures from Serbia, had already joined 
youth movements bent on destroying the monarchy, the great 
majority of Muslim politicians looked upon the falling monarchy 
as Bosnia-Herzegovina’s future! It was only in September 1918 that 
they came to accept the Yugoslav idea and caught the train that 
took them to the proclamation of the Yugoslav state. Having wan-
dered for a long time and been quite at a loss during World War 
I and having vegetated on the political margins at the time that 
the state was being created, in the autumn of 1918, this elite finally 
managed to recognize the main course of history and accept the 
fact that a new state had been established. According to records, 
as early as spring 1918 the reis-ul-ulema Jamaluddin Čaušević, a 
Muslim religious dignitary, told Dr. Anton Korošec
that he supported the establishment of a Yugoslav state, saying, 
“Do whatever you have to do, and I will stand by every action that 
brings freedom to our people. I am fed up with our own, Turkish 
and German rule.” His views were compatible with those of Mus-
lim political leaders whom only developing circumstances pushed 
onto the “Yugoslav train.” An analyst from Sarajevo is likewise on 
record as writing that Muslims were somewhat anxious about 
what awaited them in the new, Yugoslav state, their qualms deriv-
ing, among other things, from their traditional struggle for Bos-
nia’s autonomy throughout history – their “desperate … struggle 
against the entry of foreign troops into Bosnia, as testified by the 
struggle against the entry of Austrian troops in 1897.” “No wonder, 
therefore, that some felt uneasy anticipating the entry of the Ser-
bian army, for they misguidedly saw it as a foreign army of occu-
pation.” Besides, the literature often quotes an argument justify-
ing Muslim fears of life in a Yugoslav state: an alleged statement by 
Stojan Protić promising an easy solution to the Muslim question 
saying, “Once our army has crossed the Drina river we shall give 
the Turks twenty-four hours, or even forty-eight, to convert to the 
faith of their ancestors. Those refusing to obey will be beheaded, 
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as happened in Serbia earlier.” Although proved beyond any doubt 
to be a fabrication, at all crucial moments in the history of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina that statement was brought up as clear evidence 
that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be, from the very 
beginning of the Yugoslav state, cast in the role of poor wretches. 
But the Muslim elite overcame these fears and shortly after Ser-
bian troops entered Bosnia-Herzegovina in early November 1918 
honored them with a special, magnificent banquet in the Officers, 
Club in Sarajevo. The guests were served “perfectly prepared dish-
es of Bosnian-Muslim cuisine.” Along with other social celebri-
ties of Sarajevo at the time, the “flower of Muslim citizenship and 
intelligentsia” attended the ceremony. The Croatian political elite 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina – having long dreamed of a triadic system 
in the Habsburg Empire only to realize later how unrealistic that 
idea had been compared to the predominant Yugoslav idea – also 
joined in the process of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unification with 
the Yugoslav state. All Croatian political groups, including lead-
ing circles of the Catholic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina, backed 
the “Yugoslav solution.” Together with Serbian political represent-
atives, Croatian politicians also clearly demonstrated this support 
at a meeting with Hungarian prime minister Count Istvan Tisza in 
September 1918 when, in a special memorandum, they cast their 
vote for Yugoslav unification. Shortly afterwards, even the Catho-
lic Church in Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a circular calling on its 
believers and the priesthood to be “loyal to the new authorities” 
and did not label the entry of Serbian troops into Bosnia-Herze-
govina as a form of occupation. “The people need not be afraid of 
them. They should be told that this is not a hostile occupation, but 
that the Serbian troops have come at the request of our authori-
ties, to put an end to plundering and other illegal acts…”
Serbian political and religious leaders were the most actively 
involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina’s unification with Serbia. Torn 
between the idea of Bosnia’s unification with Serbia in a common 
iN peRmaNeNT Gap 
69
state and that of broader Yugoslav unification, the Serbian politi-
cal elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina preferred the latter. Serbian polit-
ical representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina had worked for the 
Yugoslav Committee in London, while in Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na proper several outstanding Serbian politicians – of whom the 
most active were Vojislav Šola, Šćepan Grđić and Danilo Dimović 
– had endeavored to come closer to their Croatian counterparts 
(Jozo Sunarić, Đuro Džamonja, Vjekoslav Jelavić and others) and 
strengthen the Yugoslav movement. When their dream came true 
in late 1918, the main objective of the Serbian political elite was 
attained: a large state incorporating the majority of Balkan Serbs 
was established. “God bless the new Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes,” said the Metropolitan of Sarajevo Evgenije Letica 
on December 5, 1918 rejoicing at the establishment of the Yugo-
slav state.
All in all, regardless of some assistance from Serbian and Cro-
atian figures and, by the end of the process, from a small group of 
Muslim politicians from the circle of Mehmed Spaho and Halid-
beg Hrasnica, both of them young and barely influential at the 
time, Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a major factor in the estab-
lishment of this state in 1918. Besides, it did not join the Yugo-
slav state in 1918 in the same manner as Vojvodina and Monte-
negro, which had first united with Serbia and then with Croatia 
and Slovenia. Bosnia-Herzegovina entered the Yugoslav state in a 
roundabout way – through the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs 
that brought together Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na. This creation, though termed “a state,” functioned in Octo-
ber and November 1918 without internationally recognized sover-
eignty and by its character was more of a provisional rather than 
a real state. It had, however, functional institutions of provision-
al government, in which representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na were included. The Committee of the People’s Council of Slo-
venes, Croats and Serbs /SCS/ constituted on October 5, 1918 in 
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Zagreb with the participation, from Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Ser-
bian and Croatian politicians (Danilo Dimović, Đuro Džamonja, 
Kosta Majkić, Jozo Sunarić and Vojislav Šola) addressed Serbian 
and Croatian leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, saying that Bosnia-
Herzegovina would have 18 deputies in the Plenary Council (8 
Serbs, 4 Croats and 6 Muslims). Still, out of the six planned Mus-
lim members, only two were elected to the Council (Hamid Svrzo 
and Mehmed Spaho). Dr. Halid-beg Hrasnica was only later add-
ed to the list.
The People’s Council of SCS for Bosnia-Herzegovina was estab-
lished in Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is much controversy about 
the exact date of its establishment, but what can be said with cer-
tainty is that the event took place before October 24, 1918 when the 
Main Committee of the People’s Council of SCS for Bosnia-Her-
zegovina initiated the formation of territorial committees. Gligo-
rije Jeftanović was the president of the Main Committee, and Jozo 
Sunarić and Halid-beg Hrasnica vice-presidents. At the sugges-
tion of the Main Committee, the Central Committee of the Peo-
ple’s Council of SCS decided on October 30, 1918 in Zagreb that 
“the Presidency of the People’s Council of SCS should be in touch 
(….) with the People’s Council in Sarajevo about members of the 
government.” Svetozar Pribićević told the meeting of the Cen-
tral Committee that Atanasije Šola from Sarajevo had informed 
him that they “were waiting for a decision by the People’s Council 
before assuming power.” At a meeting on November 3, the Cen-
tral Committee discussed the issue and approved the appoint-
ment of “autonomous authorities (…) in Bosnia,” which meant 
that the People’s Government for Bosnia-Herzegovina had been 
formed in the meantime. Atansije Šola was at the head of the gov-
ernment made up of 11 ministries. Six members of his Cabinet 
were Serbs, four were Croats and one was a Muslim. On Novem-
ber 1 the government formally assumed office in Bosnia-Herze-
govina from Stjepan Sarkotić and already on November 3 sent a 
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special diplomatic mission to Višegrad to talk to the command-
er of the Serbian Army about the role Serbian troops should play 
in the establishment of law and order in Bosnia-Herzegovina at a 
time when the “old regime” was falling apart while the new one 
was barely effective. On November 6, 1918 Serbian troops arrived 
in Sarajevo.
It is interesting to follow the relationship between the People’s 
Government for B-H and the Zagreb-seated People’s Government 
of SCS. When the establishment of the Government of People’s 
Council of SCS for B-H was decided, Matko Laginja, politician, 
lawyer and the Council’s commissioner for Istria, argued that in 
the State of SCS all institutions should comply with the Central 
Government in Zagreb and, in that context, put an emphasis on 
the government in B-H. “The Bosnian Government can only be a 
branch office of the Central Government. No government should 
be special.” Was this really the case?
When Dr. Mate Drinković, the commissioner for defense in the 
People’s Government of SCS in Zagreb, delegated some of his offic-
ers to “keep law and order” in Bosnia, Sarajevo responded prompt-
ly. The meeting of the People’s Government for B-H of November 
10, 1918 communicated to him that there was nothing for these 
officers to do in B-H given that they (the government) had invit-
ed the Serbian Army and its commander Duke Stepa Stepanović 
whose troops had already entered B-H and they had been enforc-
ing law and order. Therefore, the communication quotes, the gov-
ernment in Sarajevo is returning these officers, suggesting to the 
Zagreb-seated government “to deploy them, at your convenience, 
to keep law and order in Yugoslav regions in need of their servic-
es.” “Some of the officers who had come to Sarajevo at the order of 
the government in Zagreb, i.e. Defense Minister Mate Drinković, 
the government in Sarajevo will be put at the disposal either of 
the armed forces or the commanders of the Serbian Army.” Estab-
lishment of any army whatsoever, concluded the government in 
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Sarajevo, would be met with disapproval by the people and, there-
fore, “we deem that such an attempt should not even be made…
Serbian troops will be keeping law and order here.” In conclusion, 
the communication asks the Zagreb-seated government to “seek 
the consent of the People’s Government for Bosnia-Herzegovina 
or at least of a member of the People’s Council in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina prior to taking such major decisions so as to avoid any 
misunderstanding.”
This shows how far the government in Sarajevo relied on the 
Serbian Army, although B-H entered the Yugoslav state in 1918 
through the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs rather than via 
direct unification with Serbia as proposed by the Serbian Gov-
ernment. The Serbian government’s plans for B-H’s direct unifi-
cation with Serbia rather than through the State of Slovenes, Cro-
ats and Serbs are substantiated in many writings as well as in the 
many telegrams local authorities sent to the Serbian government 
calling for direct unification with Serbia regardless of the views of 
the Central Committee of the People’s Council of SCS in Zagreb. 
On the grounds of these documents some researchers have argued 
that the people in B-H were delighted with the arrival of Serbian 
troops and prospects for unification in a Yugoslav state.
FACING NEW REALITIES
The very act of proclamation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Cro-
ats and Slovenes on December 1, 1918 was not accompanied by 
any grand manifestations of excitement by the masses in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Whether or not the common people were aware of 
this piece of news also remains disputable. The fact that telegrams 
advocating direct unification with Serbia were sent to Belgrade 
from some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina even after December 1, 
when the new state had already been proclaimed, leaves room for 
various interpretations, not only of the identities of the authors 
of those telegrams but also of the state of affairs in the field after 
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unification. The common people had other worries. Serbian peas-
ants were making use of the time of instability and rather ineffi-
cient government to maltreat landowners and seize their lands, 
Muslim landowners were looking for a way to protect their own 
lives, while the common people were just trying to survive the 
cold winter of hunger.
Still, the question of the position of some religious and eth-
nic communities, but also of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, in 
the newly-formed Yugoslav state was raised. Formally, all reli-
gious communities were equal before the law. It took time, how-
ever, for that equality to prove itself in real life. Religious commu-
nities were subject to political influence throughout the life of the 
First Yugoslavia, and the agrarian reforms had a greater effect on 
the Islamic religious community and the Catholic rather than on 
the Orthodox Church. The Orthodox Church cooperated close-
ly with the state, given that their views about the necessity of cen-
tralization coincided.
The state mainly controlled the activity of the Islamic reli-
gious community, except for the first decade when this commu-
nity retained its autonomous status from the Habsburg era. For 
its part, the Islamic religious community demonstrated its loyal-
ty to the state. This was most evident in reis-ul-ulema Jamaluddin 
Čaušević’s address to Regent Alexander during his visit to Saraje-
vo in 1920. “Your Royal Highness,” he said, “allow me to empha-
size in this solemn hour that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
truly love your Royal Highness and the entire noble house of the 
Karađorđević dynasty. I am obliged by my love for the homeland 
to stress that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina would like to 
see the noble person of Your Royal Highness as the source of their 
full equality and equity!”
The attitude of the Catholic Church was approximately the 
same. During the Regent’s visit in 1920 Archbishop of Saraje-
vo Ivan Šarić emphasized Bosnian Catholics’ loyalty to the new 
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state and their endeavor for “a wonderfully prosperous and even 
more glorious Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.” Neverthe-
less, regulation of the status of the Catholic Church was beset by 
many problems as testified by the failed Concordat project with 
the Vatican.
Though formally equal, some communities in Bosnia-Herze-
govina were faced with multiple challenges in everyday life after 
the proclamation of unification. Muslim landowners were badly 
affected by agrarian reforms, the Muslim and Croat populations 
were subject to plunder and assaults, especially in the borderland 
with Montenegro, and political elites organized in parties by reli-
gion and ethnic origin – with the exception of the Communist 
Party, which prioritized social issues over religious and national 
– were preoccupied with debates on the number of seats in pro-
visional representational institutions, not because they believed 
that this number proved Bosnia-Herzegovina’s actual position in 
Yugoslavia, but rather, as they saw it, as a way to best represent 
the religious and ethnic interests of the communities they stood 
for. Bosnia-Herzegovina had 42 representatives in the Provisional 
People’s Representation (PNP) of the Kingdom of SCS. However, 
they did not act as a single delegation advocating the interests of 
B-H. Instead, they advocated the interests of the parties that had 
delegated them, many of which had their seats outside Bosnia-
Herzegovina. They participated in the Yugoslav Club (members 
of the Yugoslav Democratic Party and the Croatian People’s Party) 
and the Radical and People’s Club (members of the Croatian Peo-
ple’s Community), but some of them were also in the Non-Parti-
san Club.
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s status in Yugoslavia was defined in the 
St. Vitus Day Constitution of 1920, the declaration of which had 
obtained the support of B-H political parties. The Constitution 
provided centralism. The reasons why representatives of the Yugo-
slav Muslim Organization – the political party mostly standing 
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for the social, political and religious interests of the Muslims, and 
originally for federalization of the state – voted in the highly cen-
tralist Constitution as such, have been the subject of a lengthy 
public debate. No doubt that one of the reasons for their support 
was that the government had promised to respect the historical 
borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina when organizing the administra-
tion, i.e. to protect its territorial integrity. The promise was met 
under Article 135 of the Constitution but the loose wording of the 
provision left room for some municipalities and even districts to 
integrate with other regions if so decided by 3/5 of the vote in the 
Assembly. Consequently, it happened that the Constitution and 
the subsequent law on the state’s division into 33 regions – 6 of 
which related to Bosnia-Herzegovina within its historical borders 
– provided territorial entirety for Bosnia-Herzegovina but, at the 
same time, opened the door to disintegration of that entirety. And, 
indeed, this is what happened in 1929, though not through the 
possibility allowed by the constitutional provision, but at the time 
of dictatorship when the Constitution was suspended. This was 
the first time Bosnia-Herzegovina was territorially dismembered 
in the Yugoslav state and it was also the first partition in the peri-
od between the two world wars that scarred the Bosniaks’ mem-
ory of Yugoslavia as a state openly hostile to Bosnia-Herzegovi-
na. Under the law of October 3, 1929 on the state’s name and divi-
sion into administrative regions, Yugoslavia was divided into nine 
banates (or, banovina) and Bosnia-Herzegovina into four (Vrbas-
ka, Drinska, Savska and Zetska banovina). Two banates out of the 
four had seats outside B-H, and the Muslims were in the minor-
ity in each (the Serbs were in the majority in three banates and 
the Croats in one). This fact was played on in subsequent politi-
cal activity, but also in political propaganda and publishing – even 
in scholarly books – to emphasize the anti-Muslim and anti-Bos-
nian character of the state’s administrative division, and anti-Bos-
nian and anti-Muslim dimension of the new policy of integral 
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Yugoslavianism. This division certainly signaled abolition of the 
provincial specificity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, preserved for some 
time after 1918. More importantly, as the border at the Drina riv-
er was annulled, the latter found itself almost in the midst of the 
Drinska Banovina.
Between the two world wars, the Bosniaks were notably con-
cerned with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s specificity. Ever since the estab-
lishment of the Yugoslav state their policy was to preserve Bos-
nia-Herzegovina’s entirety and the main promoter of that policy 
was the Yugoslav Muslim Organization. In the mid-1930s, follow-
ing the dictatorship (either overt or covert) the Bosniaks estab-
lished the Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
On the other hand, and in opposition to the ideas of autonomy 
advocated by the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, there emerged 
another movement formed by some Muslim and pro-Croatian 
politicians and led by Hakija Hadžić. The Movement cooperated 
with Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Croats active in the Croatian People’s 
Movement and its leader Vladko Maček. As Maček put it once, the 
objective of his Movement was to unite Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia on “the grounds of the Croatian ethnic majority” (accord-
ing to him, Catholics and Muslims made up the Croatian com-
munity). “Should this turn out to be impossible to accomplish, 
we could accept a compromise on B-H that remains as a com-
plete entity but obtains autonomy,” he said. With this blurred idea 
about safeguarding Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole, Maček won 
over some Muslim politicians dissatisfied with Mehmed Spaho, 
leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, for his coalition with 
Milan Stojadinović in the mid-1930s. Spaho was blamed for hav-
ing renounced his party’s program for autonomy, though at the 
time of dictatorship he said on several occasions that Yugoslavia 
should become federalized. “Federation or separation,” he alleg-
edly told British archeologist Arthurs Evans in 1932. However, his 
coalition with Stojadinović imparted fresh vigor to the Muslim 
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branch of the Croatian Peasants’ Party (HSS) that advocated fed-
eralization as a solution to the Yugoslav crisis, but never detailing 
the federal units that would make up the state.
In the late 1930s, the Bosniak leading party, the Yugoslav Mus-
lim Organization (JMO), supported Serbian-Croatian negotia-
tions on a compromise between two conflicting concepts (cen-
tralist and federalist). They did not have the remotest idea that the 
establishment of the Banovina of Croatia /Banate), emerging from 
partitioned Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1939, would create that com-
promise solution. The notorious Cvetković – Maček Agreement 
was nourished in the memory of the Bosniaks as a perfidious Ser-
bian-Croatian pact evoking concerns for the integrity of Bosnia-
Herzegovina in the late 20th and the early 21st century.
While the Bosniaks were struggling for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s 
integrity and autonomy within Yugoslavia – all the time wavering 
between the Serbian and Croatian confronted blocs, sometimes 
siding with the former and sometimes with the latter – Croatian 
and Serbian political leaders in Bosnia-Herzegovina proper were 
divided into those who favored Bosnia’s unification with Croa-
tia and those aiming at its unification with Serbia. Some of them, 
however, stood for safeguarding Bosnia-Herzegovina’s autonomy 
from Croatia and Serbia alike, as they thought it far better to have 
autonomy than lose a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
WARTIME SPLITS AND POLITICAL (DIS)ORIENTATION
When World War II broke out, Bosnia-Herzegovina faced new 
challenges. Against the backdrop of the Bosniak autonomy move-
ment of 1939–40 – still active though not homogeneous in practice 
– and in wartime conditions that smashed the state of Yugoslavia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was incorporated into the Independent State 
of Croatia (NDH) in its entirety. The Drina river became the bor-
der once again. However, the division into 12 big administrative 
districts – six entirely in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
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six only partially – annulled its historical and political territorial 
integrity. The seats of five big districts were located outside Bos-
nia-Herzegovina’s historical borders.
Establishment of the Independent State of Croatia was the out-
come of Yugoslavia’s defeat in the war, and the peoples of Bosnia-
Herzegovina had no say in the matter. Most Croats and Bosniaks 
accepted and welcomed the newly-established state and even 
hailed the entry of German troops, while the Serbs had many rea-
sons to distrust the NDH from the very outset.
Dissatisfied with the Cvetković – Maček Agreement and the 
establishment of the Banovina of Croatia, some Muslim politi-
cians who used to form the Muslim branch of the HSS joined the 
Ustasha movement upon the outbreak of war in 1941 and inte-
grated into structures of the new NDH regime. They believed that 
integration of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina into the NDH 
was more acceptable than partition, whereby a part would go to 
Croatia and another remain reserved for the Serbian portion of 
the Yugoslav state. Others had an eye on autonomy from the very 
start and so in April 1941, their delegation, in cooperation with 
some Serbian activists, urged reis-ul-ulema Fehim Spahu to initi-
ate autonomy for B-H with the German authorities within the new 
world order. This attempt ended in disaster: the Serbian mem-
bers of the delegation were killed while the NDH regime strongly 
cautioned Muslim members to stay away from anti-government 
activity. Later on that “spark of autonomy” developed into the still 
mysterious Memorandum, allegedly sent straight to Hitler in late 
1942, asking for B-H autonomy from the NDH. However, all this 
underlined how lost the Bosniaks were during the war, how divid-
ed and committed to various political and military formations. In 
the historical arena of World War II, the Bosniak divide constitut-
ed a large spectrum ranging from loyalty to the NDH and partici-
pation in Ustasha, Domobran (homeland defenders: transl. note) 
and German military formations, through activism in the troops 
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of the “Yugoslav Army in the Homeland” and the movement for 
autonomy, to struggle in the Partisan movement, which offered 
a new vision of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an equal member of the 
Yugoslav federation. The first signs of the Bosniaks’ shaken trust 
in the NDH were already visible in the autumn of 1941 in the so-
called Muslim resolutions that indicated crisis in Bosniak circles. 
When they realized that the NDH was no protection from Chetnik 
pogroms, the Muslims’ trust in it began spiraling downward and 
rapidly shifting to the Partisan movement.
The Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina mostly welcomed the NDH 
as their nation-state, especially in Western Herzegovina where 
news of its establishment was met with “euphoria.” The idea of the 
NDH as the final realization of the centennial dream of a Croa-
tian nation-state had been nourished for a very long time, there-
fore, it was simply referred to as “our state,” “the Croatian state,” 
and the like. This was due to the Croats’ bad experience with mon-
archist Yugoslavia on the one hand and, on the other, to promis-
es about the new state being solely “Croatian and peasant,” which 
were music to the ears of the peasantry making up the majority of 
the B-H population, especially the peasantry in areas with a Cro-
atian majority population, such as Western Herzegovina. Experi-
ences were quite different in areas with an ethnically mixed popu-
lation. However, already during the war the idea of the NDH as a 
Croatian nation-state was challenged by the realities of the crimes 
committed in the name of that centennial dream. In the broad-
er context of relations between the warring parties, this was what 
gradually destroyed this state and eventually wiped it out by the 
end of the war. However, promoters of the idea popped up for 
decades following the end of World War II.
Unlike the Croats and the Bosniaks, the Serbs in Bosnia-Her-
zegovina distrusted and opposed the NDH from the very start. As 
early as April 1941. albeit still timidly at the time, they gave vent to 
their feelings. Loyal to Yugoslavia on the one hand, and exposed 
ii  – yugoslAv experience FroM nAtionAl perspectives
80
to legal and physical violence on the other, the Serbs refused to 
recognize the NDH as a state in which they saw a future for them-
selves. They soon rose up in arms: first in June in Eastern Her-
zegovina and then, in late July, in other parts of Bosnia-Herze-
govina. In June, it was more of a spontaneous revolt against vio-
lence than anything else and the rebels were predominantly well-
off peasants, the clergy and the middle-class. The June rebellion 
was mostly organized by the Communists in Bosnia-Herzego-
vina. The two movements cooperated at the beginning, but split 
up over time and some of the rebels in the June rebellion joined 
the Communist ranks, while others transformed themselves into 
the Chetnik movement. In late 1941, the two movements became 
distinct: the Partisan movement fought for a new social order, 
although committing crimes in its struggle, especially against the 
Muslims, while the other was barely concerned with Bosnia-Her-
zegovina and believed in a post-war revival of Yugoslavia with the 
Serbs playing a leading role. As the war neared its end, the Parti-
san movement was on the up and up, among other things thanks 
to recruitment of rebels who used to fight against the Partisans 
and were accomplices in the crimes against the Muslims and the 
Croats. This sowed the seed of Muslim and Croatian distrust in 
the Partisan movement, which found notable expression in their 
memorial culture in the early 1990s. The final result of World War 
II in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a heavy toll in human lives: out 
of 320,000 people killed, 164,000 were Serbs, 75,000 Bosniaks, 
64,000 Croats and about 9,000 Jews.
All in all, World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina was multi-lay-
ered, with everyone fighting everyone else, and “five fronts were 
in confrontation – the occupying force, the Ustashas, the Chet-
niks, the Muslims and the Partisans” The occupying troops had 
two wings: one in the hands of the Germans and the other of the 
Italians. “Of all the countries making up the Yugoslav state, B-H 
had the most complex war situation.” In the end, the Partisan 
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movement, which after noisy and fierce debates among the Com-
munist elite opted for Bosnia-Herzegovina’s equality within the 
Yugoslav federation, emerged as the winner. The debates on Bos-
nia-Herzegovina’s status in the future Yugoslav state (an autono-
mous or a federal unit) were not at all present on the scholarly and 
social agenda in the aftermath of the war, even once they had been 
placed on the social scene, and they were not explained adequate-
ly against the social, military and political backdrop of World War 
II, but used instead as an argument for the alleged anti-Bosnian 
and anti-Muslim orientation of the Partisan movement. Howev-
er, the truth is that the Communist leadership’s dilemma about 
the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina derived from its commitment 
to the Soviet model, according to which only ethnically pure his-
torical regions could have the status of a republic, while ethnical-
ly mixed areas such as Bosnia-Herzegovina just the status of an 
autonomous unit in a federation of national republics. And yet, 
that dilemma was settled in 1943 and 1944 when ZAVNOBi H (the 
State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina) sessions finally defined Bosnia-Herzegovina as a 
federal unit, equal with other republics within the Yugoslav state.
THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALISM
At the end of World War II in Bosnia-Herzegovina “the Serbi-
an masses were in the winning camp, the Muslims were in second 
place, while the Croats occupied the back seat (…) With the lug-
gage of old legacies and new controversial tendencies Bosnia-Her-
zegovina was opening a new chapter in its history” when it had to 
actually put into effect the equality it had formally obtained in the 
war. It was only in the late 1960s that Bosnia-Herzegovina, faced 
with the centralism of the Yugoslav state over the initial decades 
of socialist Yugoslavia, realized its full equality.
Likewise, some peoples in B-H proper were challenged with 
preserving the national equality that had been proclaimed in the 
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war. Though formally equal, though mostly on the account of 
developments duringthe war,, their experience of socialist Yugo-
slavia was a different story. Some regions with a majority Croatian 
population such as Western Herzegovina had been marginalized 
for almost two decades. At the so-called Mostar Council in 1966, 
the leadership of the B-H League of Communists raised its voice 
against it, began removing the Ustasha “mortgage” from the entire 
population of this region and thus launched the process of West-
ern Herzegovina’s integration into the larger B-H frame. However, 
that process has been never brought to an end while marginaliza-
tion of the Croat – populated regions – evident in the aftermath of 
the war – would leave resentful memories of the period of socialist 
Yugoslavia in the minds of the Croats. The Croatian political elite 
of the 1990s particularly insisted on those memories, emphasizing 
that the Croats had been subjugated in socialist Yugoslavia. The 
hardship the Croats had undergone in the aftermath of the war 
and their mass migration abroad in search of work was stressed. 
In the early 1970s, for instance, the Zagreb-seated Glas koncila 
(Voice of the Council) magazine that was distributed through-
out B-H underlined that “one Croat in every five is away from 
his homeland” and that “sad and painful is the very thought that 
this flower and hope of the Croatian people has to earn his daily 
bread away from our Beautiful Homeland.” The repression against 
the Croats during and after the Croatian Spring of the 1970s was a 
major argument used to support this thesis. One of the HDZ lead-
ers in B-H said, “We, the Croats, have definitely served our time,” 
referring to many Croats who had spent years in jail at the time of 
socialist Yugoslavia. The fact was that the percentage of the Cro-
ats in the population structure of B-H steadily dropped through-
out the period of socialist Yugoslavia (according to the census of 
1948, the Croats made up 24% of the entire population, but only 
17% in 1991), as a result of their emigration either to Croatia or 
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abroad (mostly to Germany), but also of the growth of the Mus-
lim population.
After the war not only the Croats but the Bosniaks, too, were 
faced with the challenge of rounding off their national integration. 
In the early 1960s, the B-H Communists initiated recognition of 
the Muslim nation, which they campaigned for with scholarly 
argumentation throughout the 1960s. By the end of the 1960s, the 
reality of the Muslim nation was definitely recognized by the B-H 
and Yugoslav Communist elites. Subsequent denials of the Mus-
lim nation, especially in the 1980s, were used to create precondi-
tions for destruction of the Yugoslav state and the integrity of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina. Although in Yugoslavia the Bosniaks were fully 
acknowledged as a nation, became a major cultural and social fac-
tor and expanded demographically (from 30% of the B-H popu-
lation in the 1948 census, the percentage of Bosniaks grew to 43% 
in the census of 1991), in the 1990s the Bosniak political elite was 
building a negative image of their experience of Yugoslavia. They 
emphasized the Muslims’ subjugation in the socialist era, insisting 
that that their national identity had not been recognized, that they 
had not been adequately represented in the army officer corps, 
in the police, etc, that they had been exposed to various waves of 
violence (hardship in the aftermath of World War II and trials of 
members of the Young Muslims group in 1947, 1949 and 1983, a 
hard life and migration to the Sandžak and Turkey, especially in 
the “Ranković era”), and the like.
The B-H Serbs emerged from the war as the greatest victims and 
perceived Yugoslavia as their “ home sweet home”. Researchers 
have proven that in the socialist era they had occupied key polit-
ical and social positions in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a long time. 
The story about mass atrocities and genocide against them fanned 
the flame of the Serbs’ perception of their major contribution to 
the creation of the Yugoslav socialist state and their responsibil-
ity for its safekeeping. In the early 1990s, Serbian political leaders 
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in B-H kept reminding the people that the Serbs had suffered the 
most in World War II and had been the biggest victims of the con-
flict with the Cominform, underlining that the loss of their demo-
graphic majority in B-H was a consequence of the misguided pol-
icy of the Communist elite which, having recognized the Muslims’ 
national identity, had ruthlessly worked against Serbian national 
interests, etc.
The truth is that the percentage of Serbs in the entire popula-
tion of Bosnia-Herzegovina almost crumbled at the time of social-
ist Yugoslavia (from 44% of the population in 1948 it fell to 31% in 
1991). Despite that fact, the majority of Serbian Communists were 
devoted to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s affirmation as an equal federal 
unit of Yugoslavia throughout the socialist era. What seems most 
convincing is that the B-H Communist movement as a whole 
was not ethnically oriented since the Communists endeavored to 
affirm and develop all national identities and opposed the build-
ing of a supra-national identity that could have disturbed the eth-
nic balance – a major factor of B-H, s integrity. This was evident in 
the 1960s and 1970s when some circles promoted Yugoslavianism 
and Bosnianism as national identities. The Communists of Bos-
nia-Herzegovina turned down both options flat, arguing that any-
thing like that could lead towards centralization and unitarianiza-
tion of the country (Yugoslavianism) or denial of the Serbian and 
Croatian national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosnianism).
The Communist movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina remained 
loyal to a man to Yugoslavia for a very long time. Thanks to this 
unity, Bosnia-Herzegovina modernized its society in the social-
ist era, made economic progress, integrated its infrastructure, set 
up scientific and cultural institutions, and opened itself up to the 
world. In the mid-1980s, however, serious cracks started appearing 
in this unity and continued spreading and multiplying in the sec-
ond half of the decade and, finally, after much scandal and heavy 
political propaganda, brought Bosnia-Herzegovina closer to the 
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bloody war of the 1990s. In the early 1990s, the Serbian political 
elite was rapidly turning its eyes towards Belgrade and pinning its 
hopes on survival of Yugoslavia as a safe haven for its identity. On 
the other hand, by promoting the story about marginalization of 
the Croats the Croatian and Bosniak elites were practically pre-
paring their compatriots for Yugoslavia’s inevitable disintegration 
– which, indeed, took place soon afterwards.
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN YUGOSLAVIA’S FINALE
As in 1918 when the state of Yugoslavia was established, Bos-
nia-Herzegovina was no major factor whatsoever in its disinte-
gration in the 1990s. After the parliamentary elections in 1990, 
national parties (the SDA, SDS and HDZ) came to power in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and differences in the way they perceived the 
future of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Yugoslavia became evident in 
almost no time. The HDZ promoted Yugoslavia as a loose fed-
eration, the SDS was opposing to the very idea and insisted on a 
“democratic Yugoslavia organized as a modern state,” while the 
SDA did not take a firm stand, but advocated “a modern state” 
that would be neither a confederation – as the Croats wanted – 
nor a federation, the Serbian concept. As the time went by, ideas 
about the future constitutional status of Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Yugoslavia took shape within the SDA, which eventually resulted 
in the Izetbegović – Gligorov proposal for Yugoslavia as an asym-
metrical federation. When that proposal was turned down, like 
the one for safeguarding a “rump” Yugoslavia that would include 
neither Croatia nor Slovenia, the door opened wide to Bosnia-
Herzegovina to leave Yugoslavia. On that road, however, it had to 
overcome new stumbling blocks. Non-national (left-wing) parties 
were weak and only in power in Tuzla and Vareš, while the resent-
ment of the citizens in all other parts was represented by a bloc of 
national parties that were already at loggerheads. This situation 
led towards Bosnia-Herzegovina’s implosion. The ruling political 
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parties, including the SDS and HDZ, which had their sponsors in 
Serbia and Croatia, could not reach agreement on a single mat-
ter of any importance. Debates in the republican assembly were 
fierce, brimming with nationalistic rhetoric, even warmonger-
ing, and were often conducted in a rough and crude manner. The 
strategy implemented in the field was a strategy for the breakup 
of the B-H entity through so-called regionalization. In late 1991, 
when the majority in the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted 
for independence from Yugoslavia – a vote verified in the referen-
dum of early March 1992, it became clear that the course towards 
independence would be a bloody one. The SDS opposed the out-
come of the referendum on independence, mobilized the Serbs 
with the idea about “remaining within Yugoslavia,” and decided 
to realize its policy through war. Before war actually broke out, 
with the assistance of some smaller Serbian parties (though not 
supported by the Serbs active in non-national parties), the SDS 
had established parallel Serbian institutions in municipalities and 
but also all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Simultaneously, the HDZ in 
B-H also formed the Croatian Community (later the Republic) of 
Herceg-Bosnia thus lessening the chances for the survival of B-H 
as a whole outside Yugoslavia. Nonetheless,, in the situation as it 
was in the early 1990s when the political actors in Bosnia-Herze-
govina stood no chance whatsoever of influencing the course of 
history in any major way, by following that course Bosnia-Her-
zegovina joined the states that had become independent of Yugo-
slavia. The turnout in the referendum of February 29 – March 1, 
1992 was 64% of the electorate (mostly Bosniaks and Croats) and 
99% of the people who went to the polls voted for an independent 
and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina. On April 6, 1992, the Euro-
pean Union acknowledged an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and other countries followed suit. For the first time after sever-
al centuries, Bosnia-Herzegovina had the opportunity to develop 
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its identity as a state outside other large state structures, includ-
ing Yugoslavia. It started down a road that turned out to be very 
thorny.
CONCLUSION
The Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats experienced Yugoslavia differ-
ently, above all, monarchist and socialist Yugoslavia. Bosnia-Her-
zegovina did not contribute much to the creation of the Yugo-
slav state, which it joined indirectly, through the so-called State of 
Slovenians, Croats and Serbs, and its Bosniak, Serbian and Cro-
atian representatives were not equally active in the process. Most 
Serbs and Croats adopted the idea of a Yugoslav state relatively 
early in the process but most Muslim politicians, after a long peri-
od of vacillation, only caught the “Yugoslav train” at the very end 
of the war. However, once they entered Yugoslavia, they accepted 
it as a state and actively participated in its constitutional structur-
ing, but were negatively affected by certain government moves, 
principally the agrarian reforms. The Croats and the Serbs com-
peted against each other over organization of the state, but most 
researchers claim that both Croats and Bosniaks were marginal-
ized in monarchist Yugoslavia.
The experience of socialist Yugoslavia was quite different. 
Socialist Yugoslavia ensured not only formal but true equality, 
especially as from the early 1960s. However, when perceived from 
the angle of the country’s disintegration in the 1990s and the expe-
rience of war and hardship, socialist Yugoslavia is pictured badly, 
which is then transferred into a historical experience. For exam-
ple, the level of modernization Bosnia-Herzegovina attained in 
the Yugoslav state is denied. This approach, however, has noth-
ing to do with the real historical experience of the Yugoslav state, 
especially of socialist Yugoslavia.
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